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ORDINARY COHABITATION
Ann Laquer Estin*
Twenty-five years ago, when the Supreme Court of California de-
cided the case of Marvin v. Marvin,1 it caused a sensation in the popu-
lar press. Michelle Triola began living with the actor Lee Marvin in
October 1964, while he was separated from his ife Betty. While liv-
ing with Michelle, Lee Marvin reached the peak of his career, earning
an Oscar for Cat Ballou in 1965 and making other films including The
Dirty Dozen (1967), Hell in the Pacific (1968), and Paint Your Wagon
(1969). Although Lee "compelled her to leave his household" in May
1970, he continued supporting Michelle until November 1971.2
When he stopped paying, Michelle filed an action seeking an award of
$1,800,000, or half his earnings during the six years they had spent
together.3 Her lawyer, a Los Angeles divorce attorney named Marvin
Mitchelson, was interviewed by a Newsweek reporter, who coined the
term "palimony" for her claims.4
The Maroin decision followed a series of older cases in California
that had considered claims between nonmarital partners at the end of
cohabitation relationships. 5 These cases held that a contract between
nonmarital partners was enforceable unless it rested explicitly "upon
the immoral and illicit consideration of meretricious sexual services." 6
The court refused to apply the state's community property laws to un-
married couples, but held that, in the absence of an express contract,
courts could grant relief on the basis of an implied contract, implied
partnership or joint venture agreement, constructive trust, resulting
trust, or quantum meruit 7
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
1 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
2 Id. at 110.
3 Myrna Oliver, ''Marvin" Cases Hard to Win, Palimony Proves to Be an Exlusive Pot
of Go/d, LA- Tnms, Jan. 30, 1986, at 1.
4 I.
5 See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 112.
6 Id.
7 See id at 122-23.
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On remand, the Marvin case was assigned to Judge Arthur K.
Marshall. After a three-month trial, Judge Marshall found that Lee
and Michelle had never agreed to combine or share their earnings
and property, that they had never agreed that Michelle would give up
her career as an entertainer and singer to be Lee's full-time compan-
ion and homemaker, that Lee had never agreed to provide for her
financial needs and support for the rest of her life, that Michelle had
been financially enriched rather than suffering damages from her re-
lationship with Lee, and that he had not been unjustly enriched as a
result of the relationship or her services.8 Judge Marshall did find
that Michelle was in need of funds to re-educate herself and learn new
employable skills and ordered Lee to pay $104,000 for her living ex-
penses during this "rehabilitation."9 On appeal, however, the award
was reversed, leaving Michelle with no recovery at all. 1
Lee Marvin, who married a former girlfriend from his hometown
after separating from Michelle in 1970, died of a heart attack in Au-
gust 1987 and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery." Since her
breakup with Lee, Michelle Triola Marvin has lived in a nonmarital
relationship with the actor Dick Van Dyke.12 When Judge Marshall
died in November 1999, the obituaries remembered him as the judge
who presided over Lee Marvin's palimony trial.' 3 And Marvin Mitch-
elson, who was convicted in 1993 for tax fraud, was released from
prison in 1998 and readmitted to the California bar in May 2000.14
Marvin v. Marvin has been cited in approximately two hundred
other court decisions, about half of which come from the California
8 Judge Marshall's opinion is reproduced at Marvin v. Marvin, 5 Faro. L. Rep.
(BNA) 3077, 3077 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1979).
9 See id. at 3085.
10 See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Ct. App. 1981).
11 See Associated Press, Tough-Guy Actor Lee Marvin, Cmi. Tam., Aug. 30, 1987, § 2,
at 8; Bruce McCabe, Lee Marvin, With Not Enough Warts, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 19, 1997,
at E16 (reviewing Pamela Marvin's memoir: Lee: A Romance); Bill Zwecker, Memoir,
Film Spotlight Lee Marvin, the Man, CI. SuN-TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at 3; see also Lee
Marvin Private First Class, United States Marine Corps Movie Actor, at http://
wwv.arlingtoncemetery.com/lmarvin.htm (Dec. 16, 2000).
12 See David Cuthbert, Who is that Masked Man? "Happy Face" Had a Van Dyke Beard,
NEW ORaLNS Tsms-PicAYUrqE,Jan. 1, 2000, at El (reviewing television biography spe-
cial); Monica Guttman, Dick Van Dyke: Once You Make Them Laugh, You Are Hooked, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 21, 1986, at 7; Myra Oliver, Palimony Pays for "Third Mar-
vin"-Their Attorney, LA. TMES, Jan. 30, 1986, at 24.
13 See Myrna Oliver, Arthur K Marshall: L.A. Judge Presided Over Actor Lee Marin's
Palimony Trial, LA. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1999, at A18.
14 See Ann W. O'Neill, Attorney Mitchelson Fit to Practice Law Again, Judge Rules, LA.
TIMES, May 16, 2000, at B3; see also United States v. Mitchelson, No.
CR-92-00716-WK(JR), 1995 WL 139227, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 1995).
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courts, and approximately three hundred law review articles. It is still
a fixture of family law classes, appearing as a principal case in each of
the eleven casebooks currently on the market. The term "palimony"
has entered general usage, particularly in the context of entertainers,
sports figures, and wealthy entrepreneurs. 15
With all its celebrity, the Marvin decision stands more as a cul-
tural icon than as a legal watershed. In the twenty-five years since Lee
and Michelle hit the gossip columns, rates of unmarried cohabitation
have climbed steadily, and courts have continued to confront the
claims of unmarried partners at the end of their relationships. As liv-
ing together without marriage has become less glamorous, less forbid-
den, and more ordinary among the middle class, there is more of this
legal work for courts and lawyers to do. But the law governing
nonmarital relationships remains largely an ad hoc affair, with tre-
mendous variation between states and from case to case.
At one end of the spectrum, courts in Illinois and Georgia have
refused to embrace the Marvin principle and will not enforce even
express written "relationship" contracts between unmarried cohabi-
tants. 16 At the other end of the spectrum, courts in Washington and
Nevada have begun to apply rules that treat some nonmarital oppo-
site-sex couples as if they were married for purposes of property claims
at the end of their cohabitation.' 7 In between these extremes, most
states' courts routinely enforce express agreements and recognize va-
rious equitable claims between unmarried partners, particularly where
they share a business or property.'8
15 For recent examples, see Evening Update, AltorJad; Klugman lTns $5 Million
Palimony Suit, Cm. TRIm., Dec. 2, 1999, at 2; Richard Marosi, Maglias Reach a Palimony
Settlement, L.A. T sES, Mar. 14, 2000, at B1; see also Oliver, supra note 3, at 1.
16 See Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d
1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979).
17 See W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1224-25 (Nev. 1992);
Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836-37 (Wash. 1995).
18 This was true even before the Marvin decision. Segenerally R.P. Davis, Annota-
tion, Rights and Remedies in Respect of Properiy Accumulated to, Man and Woman Living
Together in illicit Relations or Under Void Mariag, 31 A.LR.2d 1255 (1953) (citing
cases). Although there is legislation in a few states addressing claims by cohabitants,
the law in this area remains mostlyjudge-made. Minnesota and Texas statutes require
that cohabitation agreements be in writing. See MIN. STAT. AN. § 513.075 (West
1990); T x. Bus. & CoNI. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b) (3) (Vernon 1987); se also N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1992) ("Persons cohabitating and acknowledging each other as
husband and wife, and generally reputed to be such, for the period of 3 years, and
until the decease of one of them, shall thereafter be deemed to have been legally
married.").
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In these many and diverse legal approaches to cohabitation, we
can watch the courts fulfilling their time-honored common-law re-
sponsibility to revisit the law, one case at a time, and resolve the partic-
ular disputes of individual claimants. As they devise new remedies
from the commonplace tools of unjust enrichment, property, and
contract law, most courts are circumspect, carefully limiting the scope
of their decisions. These decisions, which define the normative legal
contours of ordinary cohabitation, do not suggest that Marvin was at
the vanguard of a revolutionary change in the law.
This Essay considers the social and legal norms of ordinary co-
habitation that have evolved since the Marvin decision. It is clear
from the legal and demographic literature that the social practices of
cohabitation have shifted significantly over the past twenty-five years
and that the transition is still continuing. The law, however, has not
changed at the same rate. Remedies available to cohabitants are
largely limited to untangling shared property interests and reimburs-
ing extraordinary contributions made by one partner to the other's
business or property interests. Under these rules, most cohabitants
have no rights or obligations that arise by virtue of their shared life.
I. COHABITATION TRENDS
In his opinion for the court in Marvin, Justice Tobriner famously
commented on the four-fold increase in cohabitation over the prior
fifteen years. 19 Statistics show that the number of cohabiting opposite-
sex couples has continued to increase dramatically, growing from
523,000 in 1970 to 1.6 million in 1980, 2.9 million in 1990, and 4.2
million in 1998.20 These increasing cohabitation rates reflect wide-
spread changes in values and in the social meaning of cohabitation.
For some couples, cohabitation is understood to be a stage in the
marriage process.21 Sixty percent of opposite-sex cohabitants in the
.United States go on to marry each other, and this often happens
quickly.22 The opinion in Marvin suggests this possibility explic-
19 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 109 (Cal. 1976) (citing Patrick A. Nelson,
Comment, In re Cary: AJudicial Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation, 25 HASTINcS L.J. 1226
(1974)).
20 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1999 STATISTICaLt ABSTRACT OF THE UNrED STATES 60
(1999).
21 See Pamela J. Smock, Cohabitation in the United States: An Appraisal of Research
Themes, Findings, and Implications, 26 ANN. REV. Soc. 1, 7 (2000). One reoccurring
legal question is how to treat a period of premarital cohabitation when a couple later
divorces. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
22 Larry L. Bumpass et al., The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Mariage, 53
J. MARRAGE & FAM. 913, 917 (1991). Half of cohabiting couples have either married
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itly, 23 and there is demographic evidence to confirm the pattern. As
cohabitation rates have increased, marriage rates have declined, and
the average age at first marriage has consistently increased.2'4 By 1995,
more than half of all "first unions" began as cohabitation
relationships.2
Numerous studies have found that cohabiting relationships are
less stable than married relationships and that marriages preceded by
cohabitation are less stable than those in which the couple did not live
together prior to their marriage.2 6 It is not clear, however, whether
cohabitation causes the increase in the chances for divorce. -7 Over
time, the patterns have shifted; fewer cohabiting couples are going on
to marry each other, and more are breaking up.28
or broken up after one and one-half years. Id; see alsoJudith A. Seltzer, Families Formed
Outside of Marriage, 62 J. MARRIAGE & F~m. 1247, 1249, 1250-51 (2000).
23 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122.
We are aware that many young couples live together without the solem-
nization of marriage, in order to make sure that they can successfully later
undertake marriage. This trial period, preliminary to marriage, serves as
some assurance that the marriage will not subsequently end in dissolution to
the harm of both parties.
Id. There are many divorce cases that reflect a period of premarital cohabitation. See
cases cited infra note 31.
24 SeeBumpass et al., supra note 22, at 914-18;Jay D. Teachman et al., The Chang-
ing Demography of America's Families, 62J. M oARRIAGE & Fu.,. 1234, 1235-36 (2000).
25 See Larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for
Children's Family Contexts in the United States, 54 PoPuLMON STuD. 29, 33 (2000). To
some extent, this is a generational change; the proportion of unmarried unions
among younger age cohorts has steadily increased. Bumpass and Lu stress the "dra-
matic role of cohort replacement as the cohorts on the leading edge of the shift to
cohabitation have progressed through the age structure." Id. at 32.
26 See Seltzer, supra note 22, at 1252 ("MIhere is evidence that the inverse rela-
tionship between premarital cohabitation and marital stability is diminishing."). Con-
tra Smock, supra note 21, at 13.
27 As summarized by Judith Seltzer
Informal unions dissolve more quickly than do formal marriages be-
cause of differences in the quality of the match between partners who marry
and those who do not, the strength of normative consensus favoring mar-
riage, the legal and social institutions that support formal marriage over co-
habitation, and differences in the attitudes and resources of cohabitors and
those who marry.
Seltzer, supra note 22, at 1252.
28 See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 25, at 33. These scholars suggest that, "[als co-
habitation becomes increasingly accepted, cohabitations may include a greater pro-
portion of couples with less serious commitments-who decide to cohabit as a matter
of temporary convenience-leading to lower marriage and higher dissolution rates
for the population as a whole." Id.; see also Seltzer, supra note 22, at 1250-52; Smock,
supra note 21, at 13.
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The period since the Marvin decision has also been marked by
high divorce rates, which have leveled off since reaching a peak in
1980.29 Divorce interacts with cohabitation in interesting ways. Many
divorced individuals choose to cohabit with a partner before entering
into a second marriage or as an alternative to a second marriage.30 A
surprising number of published cases treat the claims of cohabitants
who had been married to each other, and divorced, and then re-
sumed cohabitation without marrying again.31 As divorce rates in-
crease, the standard for a successful long-term marriage increases as
well, making a trial period seem more important. The fear of divorce
may itself prevent some couples from marrying.3 2 Some demogra-
phers believe that the fact that cohabitation is available as an alterna-
tive to marriage has helped to stabilize divorce rates.3 3 Marriage may
appear more stable than cohabitation because individuals in less
promising relationships today choose not to marry.
Some couples choose cohabitation rather than marriage as an
ethical matter, based on their personal values and their views of mar-
riage as an institution. 34 In her report of qualitative empirical re-
search conducted in the United Kingdom, Carol Smart characterizes
these as "reflexive relationships."35 By "reflexive relationships," she
means
those in which the couples spectate upon the reasons for entering a
relationship, who seek (jointly) to define the nature of that rela-
tionship and its boundaries and qualities, who monitor the progress
29 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1998 STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF TmE UNITED STATES
111 (1998).
30 According to Bumpass et al., supra note 22, at 918, sixty percent of persons who
remarried between 1980 and 1987 had lived with a partner prior to remarrying.
31 E.g., Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1325-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Eaton v,
Johnston, 681 P.2d 606, 607 (Kan. 1984); Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 873-74
(Miss. 1986); Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38, 39-41 (Tenn. 1991); Kinnison v. Kinnison,
627 P.2d 594,594-95 (Wyo. 1981); see also In reMarriage of Bukaty, 225 Cal. Rptr. 492,
494-95 (Ct. App. 1986) (reporting that the married couple cohabited for twenty-
seven years after their divorce and before their second marriage).
32 See Smock, supra note 21, at 5.
33 See Seltzer, supra note 22, at 1253.
34 For same-sex couples, of course, cohabitation is not evaluated as an alternative
to marriage, since same-sex marriage is not an option in the United States.
35 Carol Smart, Stories of Family Life: Cohabitation, Marriage and Social Change, 17
CAN.J. FAm. L. 20, 36 (2000); see also Vivienne Elizabeth, Cohabitation, Marriage and the
Unruly Consequences of Difference, 14 GENDER & Soc'Y 87, 87-107 (2000) (reporting a
study based on interviews with nineteen cohabiting individuals characterized as "mar-
riage resisters").
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of the relationship and put in place contingency plans (like wills) to
manage unforeseen or even foreseen changes.3 6
Her study, as well as the anecdotal accounts of unmarried couples
that appear regularly in the news media, suggests that these long-term
cohabiting couples are more likely to value equality and indepen-
dence.37 What percentage of cohabiting couples fit this description is
impossible to determine, however, from the statistical demographic
evidence.
Although some couples view cohabitation as a transition to mar-
riage, and others make a deliberate decision to reject marriage, many
couples fit into a third group. For these couples, moving in together
and remaining in an unmarried relationship is largely a response to
circumstances. Carol Smart's study describes cohabitation in "risk re-
lationships," which she defines as "relationships... that are based on
taking a chance (which can be a gradual process) or seizing an oppor-
tunity (which can be quite spontaneous) when faced with significant
life events."38 Smart's study also revealed that men and women had
different perspectives on these relationships. The women "expected
the relationships to last only if the men were prepared to change in
some fundamental way."3 9 Although the women were interested in
marriage, they were uncertain whether marriage to this particular
man was a good idea. The men in this study were also waiting to see if
the relationship would work out, but their concerns centered more on
remaining independent, and they were "alert to the need to be able to
get away cleanly."4°0
For couples in this third group, the choice of cohabitation may
be strongly influenced by economic factors. The court in Marvin
36 Smart, supra note 35, at 36. She contrasts reflexive relationships with "risk rela-
tionships," discussed below.
37 See, e.g., Michael D'Antonio, Unnarital Bliss, LA. TmEs, Apr. 9, 2000, (Maga-
zine) at 20; Karen S. Peterson, Couples Are Less Lifdey to Choose Maniage, USA TODAY,
Apr. 18, 2000, at 1D; Abigail Trafford, Second Opinion: The Case for Maniage sn ' Open
and Shut, WASH. Posr, Oct. 17, 2000, at Health 1; Rene Wisely, i79y Couples Don't "Tie
the Knot DEmorr Nuvs, Apr. 12, 2000, at Features 1.
38 Smart, supra note 35, at 36. She goes on to observe: "Often it isjust hoped that
things will work out somehow and actual expectations are left unsaid or are rather
minimal." Id
39 Id. at 41. Many of these men were unemployed, and there was a significant
incidence of domestic violence within this group. Id. at 42. Smart points out that
there is also a class dimension to this problem: women who are welfare recipients risk
losing important benefits if they marry, suggesting that their caution around marriage
is economically rational. Id. at 37.
40 Id. at 45. Even those men in reflexive relationships stressed the value of inde-
pendence as one reason to choose cohabitation over marriage. Id. at 39.
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noted that for some couples marriage may mean a loss of pension,
welfare, or tax benefits.41 For others, the cost of a wedding, or of
dissolving a previous marriage, may be a significant factor.42 Various
studies report that cohabitation is more common among couples with
less education and fewer economic resources.43 Men's circumstances
are particularly significant here; women are more likely to marry when
there is a better supply of "marriageable" men, defined in terms of
income, education, and employment.44
The economic profiles of cohabiting couples tend to be different
from married couples. As a group, cohabitants are more likely than
married couples to have relatively comparable earnings and more
likely to remain together where their earnings remain equal.45 This is
in contrast to married couples, who are somewhat more likely to re-
main together where there is a specialization of labor.46 The evidence
also suggests that cohabitants are more likely to make the transition to
marriage where the male partner's earnings and education are
higher.47
Rates of marriage and cohabitation are notably different between
racial and ethnic groups. Census data indicates that Hispanic women
are more likely to marry at an early age, and African-American women
are less likely to marry at all.48 When nonmarital unions are included
in the household formation picture, however, racial differences are
reduced, since African-American couples are more likely to cohabit
41 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 117 n.1l (Cal. 1976).
42 Id.; see also Oystein Kravdal, Does Marriage Require a Stronger Economic Underpin.
ning than Informal Cohabitation 2, 53 POPULATIoN STrUD. 63, 67 (1999).
43 SeeANR-mwJ. CHERUN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 11-18 (1992); Seltzer,
supra note 22, at 1250; see also Kravdal, supra note 42, at 63-80 (reviewiing data from
Norway). But seeJulie Brines & KaraJoyner, The Ties that Bind: Principles of Cohesion in
Cohabitation and Marriage, 64 Am!. Soc. REV. 333, 341 (1999) (noting that cohabiting
and married couples have similar combined earnings during their first year together).
44 See Teachman et al., supra note 24, at 1237.
45 See Brines &Joyner, supra note 43, at 341, 350-51.
46 See id. at 348-50.
47 See PamelaJ. Smock & Wendy D. Manning, Cohabiting Partners'Economic Ciracm.
stances and Mariage 34 DEMOGRAPHY 331, 338 (1997). These authors also report that
women's economic circumstances have no apparent effect on the transition from co-
habitation to marriage. See id. Bumpass has demonstrated that despite a popular con-
ception that cohabitation is a college student phenomenon, rates of cohabitation
have been consistently higher for young people in lower economic classes and lower
among better educated segments of the population. Bumpass et al., supra note 22, at
916-17.
48 Teachman et al., supra note 24, at 1236.
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than white couples.49 To what extent these differences are a function
of economic circumstances is uncertain. Although it is clear that job
opportunities and earning power have diminished significantly for Af-
rican-American men, the empirical evidence suggests that neither wo-
men's increased earning power or men's decreased earning power
fuly explains the lower rates of marriage for African-Americans.50
Demographers have noted one particularly significant change in
cohabitation relationships over the past twenty-five years. There has
been a substantial increase in the numbers of unmarried couples hav-
ing or raising children together. By 1995, fifty percent of all cohab-
iting couples lived with children.51 This change is connected to the
enormous increase in nonmarital births over the same time period.52
Most of the recent increases in unmarried childbearing results from
births to cohabiting couples rather than births to single women.5 3
Unmarried parents increasingly choose cohabitation rather than mar-
riage when an unexpected pregnancy occurs. In addition, a large pro-
portion of children born to single mothers, as well as some children
born to married parents, go on to experience cohabiting families.54
As a result, cohabitants often play an active role as stepparents for
their partners' children.55
49 Id. at 1238. The authors note studies indicating that African-Americans are
also less likely to move from cohabitation to marriage. &e, e.g., Wendy D. Manning &
PamelaJ. Smock, Why Many? Race and the Transition to Marriage Among Cohabitors, 32
DFifoGRAPH' 509, 518 (1995). Note, however, that there is no racial difference in the
proportion of couples who have ever cohabited. See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 25, at
32.
50 The difference may result from changes in local marriage markets-a decline
in the pool of marriageable men-rather than men's economic position relative to
women. Teachman et al., supra note 24, at 1237-38.
51 Bumpass & Lu, supra note 25, at 34-35; see also Seltzer, supra note 22, at
1251-52; Smock, supra note 21, at 13.
52 In 1970,just over ten percent of all births were nonmarital births. U.S. DEP'T
OF CozmMERCE, 1992 STATISTICAl. ABSTRACT OF THE UNrr STTEs 828, tbl. 1365
(1992). By 1995 almost one-third were nonmarital. U.S. DEP'T OF CO. .lrC, supra
note 29, at 81, tis. 101, 102, 1365.
53 Overall, almost forty percent of all children born to unmarried women from
1990 to 1994 had parents cohabiting at the time of birth. See Bumpass & Lu, supra
note 25, at 34-35. There are racial and ethnic differences here as well. For white and
Hispanic mothers, the rate was fifty percent or more; for black mothers, the rate was
twenty-two percent See id.
54 See id at 35.
55 Seltzer, supra note 22, at 1251-52. The presence of children in cohabiting
households increases the likelihood that the cohabitants will go on to many. See Man-
ning & Smock, supra note 49, at 517-18.
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Beyond these three groups, same-sex couples form another large
category of cohabitants. 56 Whatever their values and motivations,
these couples do not now have the right to marry. As a consequence,
their cohabitation cannot be understood as a transitional stage prior
to marriage or as a deliberate rejection of marriage. Most likely, how-
ever, there are similar differences between the "reflexive" and "risk"
relationships within this group, at least to the extent that some
couples plan their cohabitation carefully and monitor the progress of
their relationship, while others act more spontaneously.
Judith Seltzer points out that cohabiting couples are very diverse
in part "because they are forming their relationships under a rapidly
changing set of social rules about marriage, cohabitation, and
childbearing outside of marriage."5 7 Steven Nock characterizes co-
habitation as an "incomplete institution."5 8 The instability of the rules
fosters experimentation, and makes it difficult to understand what co-
habitation means. Without established social norms and expectations,
cohabiting couples need to invent the rules for their relationship as it
unfolds. 59 Frequently, these rules are based on equality principles,
and there is evidence to suggest that cohabitation relationships are
more stable where couples have an equal balance of power.60 Equality
56 Statistical data is much more difficult to develop for this group. See generally
Dan Black et al., Demographics of the Gay and Lesbian Population in the United States:
Evidence from Available Systematic Data Services, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 139 (2000).
57 Seltzer, supra note 22, at 1263.
58 Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabitating Relationships, 16J.
FAM. ISSUES 53, 56-57 (1995); see also PHILIp BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERI-
cAN COUPLES 321-22 (1983).
59 See Brines &Joyner, supra note 43, at 350-51. A couple looking for practical
assistance might find advice books in a library or bookstore covering some of the
legal, financial, and psychological dimensions of cohabitation. See, e.g., ROSANNE Ro.
SEN, THE COMPLETE IDIOT'S GUIDE TO LIVING ToGitTHER (2000). For a particularly
detailed legal guide, see TONI LYNNE IHARA ET AL., THE LIVING TOGETHER KIT: A LWGAL
GUIDE FOR UNMARRIED COUPLES (10th ed. 2001) (with CD-ROM).
60 Brines and Joyner put the point this way:
Cohabiting couples are prone to follow the equality principle because
of the conditions they confront, high uncertainty, an unspecified time hori-
zon, and the absence of a reliably enforceable contract. These conditions
grant couples a certain freedom to experiment with organizational forms
that are less responsive to external norms or contractual obligations and
more responsive to the needs of each partner. This freedom, however,
comes with the loss of incentives to invest jointly in the relationship and of
clear cultural guidelines for how partners might conduct themselves once
they set up a household.
Brines &Joyner, supra note 43, at 350-51; see also Seltzer, supra note 22, at 1253-54
(noting that couples who cohabit have more liberal gender-role attitudes). But see
Smock, supra note 21, at 14 (noting that cohabiting and married couples are not
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is difficult, however, to achieve and to maintain over a long period of
time.61
11. LEGAL Nopws
Against this background of social experimentation and demo-
graphic change, the courts have articulated legal norms that reinforce
the tendency toward equality as the organizing principle in cohabita-
tion relationships. By refusing to assimilate cohabitation to the norms
of marriage, the courts define ordinary cohabitation as a relationship
in which the parties do not acquire rights or take on obligations to
each other. In most states, the sharing norms that apply to property
and support claims at the dissolution of a marriage do not apply. To
the extent that cohabiting couples are aware of this difference, it is a
signal that sharing behavior is not expected and that such'behavior
may prove to be financially risky in the long run.
Courts in a few states have signaled their willingness to compen-
sate cohabitants for the types of sharing behavior that we associate
with marriage. In Washington and Nevada, courts apply the law gov-
erning distribution of community property to some cohabiting
couples "by analogy."62 In Kansas, Mississippi, and Oregon, courts
sometimes enter property distribution orders in cohabitation cases
based on "general equitable principles."6 ,3 In California, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin, courts achieve a similar result through generous
application of implied contract principles."
In all these jurisdictions, however, relief under these principles is
limited to cohabitants who lived together in stable, long-term relation-
ships.65 The requirement that this cohabitation be "marriage-like" has
different in their division of household labor and that women "perform the vast ma-
jority of housework in both contexts").
61 See Brines &Joyner, supra note 43, at 351.
62 SeeW. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Nev. 1992); Connell
v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 835-36 (Wash. 1995).
.63 See Eaton v. Johnston, 681 P.2d 606, 610-11 (Kan. 1984); Pickens v. Pickens,
490 So. 2d 872, 875-76 (Miss. 1986); Shuraleffv. Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764, 768-69 (Or.
Ct. App. 1991).
64 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976); Goode v. Goode, 396
S.E.2d 430, 439 (W. Va. 1990); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313-14 (AVIs. 1987).
Decisions in Nevada and Oregon, predating the cases cited in the two preceding
notes, indicated support for this kind of generous view of implied contract principles.
See Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 675 (Nev. 1984); Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 510 (Or.
1978).
65 A number of California cases have denied recovery to individuals in long-term
relationships who did not share a household, on the basis that there as no consider-
tion for any implied or express contracts. See Bergen v. Wood, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 79
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led at least one court to conclude that recovery is not available to
same-sex partners, since they are excluded from marriage. 66 Relief
may be limited to orders distributing property accumulated during
the period of cohabitation, as opposed to orders for ongoing
support.67
Those courts asserting inherent equitable authority to divide co-
habitants' property draw an analogy to the remedies available after
the breakup of a common-law business partnership, rather than the
remedies available for dissolution of marriage.68 Recognizing the par-
ties' joint efforts toward accumulation of property, including both fi-
nancial and nonfinancial contributions,6 9 these decisions approve
(Ct. App. 1993) (reversing the award to a plaintiff who did not live with the defendant
and who could not show any consideration independent of the sexual relationship);
Taylor v. Fields, 224 Cal. Rptr. 186, 194 (Ct. App. 1986) (approving summary judg-
ment in a case brought against the wife of a deceased lover after forty-two year rela-
tionship). The requirement of cohabitation was not applied to a partition case where
a dating couple acquired real property together and terminated their relationship
without ever marrying. Milian v. DeLeon, 226 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835 (Ct. App. 1986).
The recovery in Milian is better explained by the principles outlined infra at text ac-
companying notes 62 to 64. These cases frequently involve couples who held them-
selves out as married, and a number of them describe relationships in which the
parties were married, then divorced, and then resumed cohabitation without mar-
rying a second time. See cases cited supra note 63. In some cases, courts seem influ-
enced by the fact that one or both of the cohabiting individuals is married to
someone else. See, e.g., Thomas v. LaRosa, 400 S.E.2d 809, 811-14 (W. Va. 1990).
66 Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240, 242-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), appeal
docketed, 11 P.3d 825 (Wash. 2000). The court did suggest, however, that Vasquez
could make a claim based on constructive trust or implied partnership theories. Sri
id. at 242-43. This is consistent with practice in many jurisdictions in which courts
apply the rules outlined in the text below to same-sex as well as opposite-sex cohabi-
tants. See, e.g., Bramlett v. Selman, 597 S.W.2d 80, 85 (Ark. 1980) (constructive trust);
Weekes v. Gay, 256 S.E.2d 901, 904 (Ga. 1979) (implied trust); Ireland v. Flanagan,
627 P.2d 496, 500 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (implied contract to hold title as cotenants);
Mitchell v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1200, 1206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (unjust enrichment);
Doe v. Roe, 475 S.E.2d 783, 787 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (constructive trust); Small v.
Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24, 26-27 (Tex. App. 1982) (constructive trust).
67 See Thomas, 400 S.E.2d at 814-15 (rejecting a claim for support); Goode v.
Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 439 n.16 (W. Va. 1990) (allowing an implied contract claim
for property distribution); see also Pickens, 490 So. 2d at 875 (citing Taylor v. Taylor,
317 So. 2d 422 (Miss. 1975)). But see Byrne v. Laura, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 913-16 (Ct.
App. 1997) (allowing cohabiting partner to enforce promises for support against the
other partner's estate). Some cases distinguish Marvin as a case involving a claim for
"palimony," that is ongoing support payments. E.g., Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d at 1327.
68 E.g., Eaton, 681 P.2d at 610; Pickens, 490 So. 2d at 875-76.
69 E.g., Pickens, 490 So. 2d at 876; Wilburv. DeLapp, 850 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Or. Ct.
App. 1993).
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property division orders without requiring proof of express or implied
agreements. 70
In Oregon, the courts begin by attempting to determine the par-
ties' intent, but "[i]n the absence of an expression of intent... look at
the facts and inferences that can be drawn therefrom to determine
whether the parties implicitly agreed to share assets equally."71 Fac-
tors that are relevant to this determination include "how the parties
held themselves out to their community, the nature of the cohabita-
tion, joint acts of a financial nature, if any, how title to the property
was held, and the respective financial and nonfinancial contributions
of each party."72 The cases suggest that there is a presumption that
cohabitants intend to share property where there are such joint finan-
cial acts, absent specific evidence to the contrary.73
Courts that premise recovery on an implied contract between co-
habitants rely on evidence of the parties' relationship and particularly
on their financial conduct.74 Recovery is more likely where the parties
had a long-term relationship, where they represented themselves as
70 In Kansas, courts sometimes invoke this equitable authority as basis for relief
where the parties have failed to prove the existence of a common-law marriage. Ste In
reMarriage of Thomas, 825 P.2d 1163, 1165-67 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); Eaton, 681 P.2d
at 610-611. Both of these cases involved formerly married couples who resumed co-
habitation after being divorced.
71 Wallender v. Wallender, 870 P.2d 232, 234 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). This is consis-
tent with the suggestion in Alarvin that courts might divide property "in accord uith
the parties' own tacit understanding and that in the absence of such understanding
the courts [may] fairly apportion property accumulated through mutual effort." Mar-
vin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121 (Cal. 1976), quoted inAlderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 610, 615 (Ct. App. 1986).
72 Walender, 870 P.2d at 234; see also Pinto v. Smalh, 955 P.2d 770, 773 (Or. CL
App. 1998) (noting that no one of these factors is dispositive); Ireland v. Flanagan,
627 P.2d 496, 499-500 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (applying the same rule to a cohabiting
same-sex couple).
73 Compare Wdbur, 850 P.2d at 1151 ("There is no evidence that this financial
arrangement was not agreeable to both parties."), with Wallender, 870 P.2d at 234-35
("[P]laintiff knew that defendant did not intend to share his omership of the farm
after the dissolution."). In Shuraleffv. Donnely, 817 P.2d 764, 768 (Or. Ct. App. 1991),
the court refused to give effect to one party's evident intention not to share property
where the other party thought the finances involved "just one pot."
74 See Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610, 615 (Ct. App. 1986); Goode V.
Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 438 (W. Va. 1990); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313 (WIs.
1987) (citing Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 510 (Or. 1987)).
In Taylor v. Polackwich, 194 Cal. Rptr. 8 (Ct. App. 1983), the appellate court re-
versed a "rehabilitative" property and support award made by the trial court after a
jury had concluded there was no implied agreement to acquire propertyjointy. Id. at
11-12. During their eight-year cohabitation, Joseph supportedJanina and her seven
children. Il at 10. Janina earned some income and received welfare payments; she
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husband and wife, and where they combined their financial resources.
Joint bank accounts, jointly owned property, joint purchases, and
jointly filed income tax returns seem particularly significant.
The same factors are important in the cases in Washington, which
permit distribution of property based on an analogy to community
property rules for parties to a "meretricious relationship. '75 Without
acknowledging the irony of its terminology, the Washington Supreme
Court defines a meretricious relationship as "a stable, marital-like rela-
tionship where both parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful mar-
riage between them does not exist."76 The court goes on to state,
"Relevant factors... include, but are not limited to: continuous co-
habitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of the relationship,
pooling of resources and services for joint projects, and the intent of
the parties."77 The court has recently stressed that not all cohabita-
tion relationships "rise to the level of meretricious relationships" and
therefore justify an equitable division of property.78 Where cohabita-
tion is sporadic, where one or both of the parties is married to an-
other person, or where one, party wants to get married but the other
refuses, the evidence may not establish that there was mutual intent to
form a stable, long-term relationship. 79 Moreover, the court of ap-
peals recently concluded that a same-sex couple could not have a
"meretricious relationship" in Washington state because they were not
free to marry.8 0
paid $205 a month as "rent" to Joseph and got receipts for these payments to show the
welfare department. d
75 The division of property is somewhat different than what would be ordered in
a divorce case. Property acquired during a meretricious relationship is presumed to
belong to both parties, without regard to who holds title. See Connell v. Francisco,
898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995). Only property acquired during the relationship may
be considered for distribution. See id. It need not be equally divided. See In re Mere-
tricious Relationship of Sutton and Widner, 933 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Wash. Ct. App.
1997) (sustaining an award to a cohabitant of thirty-six percent of accumulated assets
based on her share of the parties' combined annual income). The courts in meretri-
cious relationship cases confront the usual complexities of community property distri-
bution, however, including commingling and tracing questions, see Koher v. Morgan,
968 P.2d 920, 921-22 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), and valuation of professional goodwill,
see Chesterfield v. Nash, 978 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764 (Wash. 2000).
76 Connel, 898 P.2d at 834 (citing In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328 (Wash.
1984)).
77 Id.
78 In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 773 (Wash. 2000).
79 Id at 771-72.
80 Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
[VOL 76:,r1394
ORDINARY COHABITATION
Historically, the doctrine of common-law marriage served to as-
similate many unmarried couples into the institution of marriage.8'
In the group of states that still recognizes common-law marriage,82
cohabitants who can establish such a marriage have all the rights of
married individuals, including property rights when their relationship
ends in death or divorce.83 As cohabitation without marriage has be-
come more open and widespread across social classes, common-law
marriage has faded in significance. It is also harder to prove, since
unmarried couples today are less likely to feel the need to represent
themselves as married.
Although the states discussed above make broad remedies availa-
ble to some cohabitants when their relationship ends, most cohabita-
tion relationships are subject to a much narrower set of legal rules.
The published cases suggest that cohabitants in most states are able to
recover in only a few types of situations. Courts are willing in almost
every state to enforce express contracts between cohabitants, particu-
larly if those agreements are in writing. Courts are regularly called
upon to sort out the parties' property interests where they have taken
title jointly or commingled their finances. Courts sometimes order
restitution for major financial contributions made by one cohabiting
partner to the other or for services that go beyond ordinary house-
hold work. In most states, however, one partner does not share in the
other's financial gains from employment or investment and is not
compensated for financial support or household services provided to
the other partner.
A. Express Contracts Between Cohabitants Are Enforceable
In its opinion in Marvin the California Supreme Court reaffirmed
its rule that express contracts between cohabitants are enforceable,
81 Courts in many of the cohabitation cases, beginning with Marvin, are careful to
acknowledge that common-law marriage has been abolished in their state. /g., Mar-
vin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 n.24 (Cal. 1976). For the court in Illinois, the aboli-
tion of common-law marriage was presented as a significant factor barring
recognition of any legal or equitable claims between cohabitants. &eHewitt v. Hewitt,
394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209-10 (Ill. 1979). On the history of common-law marriage and its
abolition, see MCaA.L GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LW ,AND THE FAMILY IN
NjrEENm-Crt AimmcA 83-102 (1985).
82 Common-law marriages may still be contracted in Alabama, Colorado, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylhania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Texas, and Utah.
83 See HomRro H. CLmuc, JR, THE LAW OF Do~tr.Smc RLros IN "mE Uxnrrw
STATES 45-54 (2d ed. 1988). Recovery as a common-law spouse requires proof that
both members of the couple were free to marry and that they had a present intention
to be married. Id.
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unless "sexual acts form an inseparable part of the consideration for
the agreement."8 4 This principle was already well established in Cali-
fornia and in other states,85 and many state courts have subsequently
indicated their agreement with Marvin on this point.8 6 In Minnesota
and Texas, the statutes of frauds have been amended to require that
cohabitation contracts be put in writing.87 Most other states permit
proof of an oral express contract, and the contracts discussed in the
cases are rarely based on a writing.88
Courts (and juries) are sometimes persuaded, and sometimes not
persuaded, by evidence of an express oral contract. Michelle Marvin
may be a typical plaintiff in her failure, ultimately, to persuade the
trial court that the parties had reached an agreement.8 9 In New York
and several other states, the courts have approved enforcement of ex-
press, but not implied, contracts, because of the problems of proof
84 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 114; see id. at 111-15.
85 See Vallera v. Vallera, 134 P.2d 761, 736 (Cal. 1943); Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 12
P.2d 430, 431-32 (Cal. 1932); see also Heatwole v. Stansbury, 33 So. 2d 196, 197 (La.
1947); Baxter v. Wilburn, 190 A. 773, 774 (Md. 1937). These rules were revisited by
other courts in other states in the early 1970s, and those courts reached similar con-
clusions. See, e.g., Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E.2d 691, 695-96 (Mass. 1975); Tyranski
v. Piggins, 205 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); Latham v. Latham, 547 P.2d
144, 146-47 (Or. 1976).
86 See Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142, 145-46 (Conn. 1987) (including ciut-
tions); see also Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664, 668 (Ariz. 1984); Wilcox v. Trautz, 693
N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998); Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. 1977);
Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 906 (NJ. 1979); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d
1154, 1156-57 (N.Y. 1980); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Wis. 1987). Contra
Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977); Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1206. See gener-
ally George L. Blum, Annotation, Property Rights Arising fror Relationship of Couple Co-
habiting Without Marriag4 69 A.L.R.5th 219 (1999). Although they are rare, there are
cases decided after Marvin in which the validity of the consideration for a colabita-
tion agreement was seriously considered. Compare Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130,
133 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding sexual services an inseparable part of the considera-
tion), with Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 409-10 (Ct. App. 1988) (find-
ing sexual relationship severable from the remainder of the contract).
87 MwN. STAT. ANN. §§ 513.075-.076 (West 1990), applied in Roatch v. Puera, 534
N.W.2d 560 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); TEx. Bus. & Com. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b) (3)
(Vernon 1987), applied in Zaremba v. Cliburn, 949 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App. 1997).
88 Cases addressing written agreements include Wilcox, 693 N.E.2d at 147-48 (set-
tlement agreement entered into by cohabitants after a twenty-five year relationship);
Silvery. Starrett, 674 N.Y.S.2d 915, 919-20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (settlement agreement
entered into by a lesbian couple at the end of a fourteen year cohabitation); Baldas,
sari v. Baldassari, 420 A.2d 556, 559-60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (agreement regarding
use of real estate); and Harman v. Rogers, 510 A.2d 161, 166 (Vt. 1986) (agreement to
own and develop a residential apartment building).
89 See supra text accompanying note 8.
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with implied contracts. 90 Other cases suggest that the line between
implied contracts and express oral contracts is difficult to draw, how-
ever, since in both situations "reference to the parties' actions is usu-
ally necessary ... to ascertain the terms of the agreement." 9 1 One
court, concluding that the parties had an express oral contract, made
this observation:
Although isolated acts ofjoint participation such as cohabitation or
the opening of ajoint account may not suffice to create a contract,
the fact finder may infer an exchange of promises, and the exis-
tence of the contract, from the entire course of conduct between
the parties. Here, there is ample evidence to support a finding that
[the cohabitants] agreed to pool their -esources and share equally
in certain accumulations; their course of conduct may be seen as
consistently demonstrating the existence of such an agreement.92
Plaintiffs seem to have more success persuading the court that
there was an express oral agreement in cases that also fit within the
other principles described below. Conversely, plaintiffs in states that
reject implied contract remedies for cohabitants are sometimes suc-
cessful in refraining their claims based on property theories or equita-
ble remedies.93
B. Commingled Property Is Divided Between Cohabitants at the
End of Their Relationship
Courts routinely divide the shared property of cohabiting part-
ners at the end of their relationship. The property disputed ranges
from real estate, automobiles, and bank accounts to furniture and
household items. Many of these disputes are framed as actions for
partition or accounting where cohabitants held property as joint te-
90 See Morone 413 N.E.2d at 1156; see also iilcox, 693 N.E.2d at 144-46; Merrill v.
Davis, 673 P.2d 1285, 1286 (N.M. 1983).
91 Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Boland,
521 A.2d at 144; Cook, 691 P.2d at 667; and Kozlowldi, 403 A.2d at 906). This boundary
is particularly important in states such as NewYork and Massachusetts, in which courts
enforce express, but not implied, contracts between cohabitants.
92 Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664, 667 (Ariz. 1984). Other cases in which courts have
found express oral agreements include Donovan v. Sruderi, 443 A.2d 121, 125-26 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1982); Kinkenon v. Hu 301 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Neb. 1981); and
Knauer v. Knauer, 470 A.2d 553, 558 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
93 The most dramatic example of this tendency is Illinois, where the Hewitt case
rejected the Marvin decision in sweeping terms. Heitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204,
1209 (Ill. 1979). Despite Hewitt, the Illinois Court of Appeals approved relief for co-
habitants in a number of cases on a constructive trust theory. Sce Kaiser Y. Strong, 735
N.E.2d 144, 148-49 (M11. App. Ct. 2000); Spafford v. Coats, 455 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983).
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nants or cotenant. 94 Although the determination of ownership is
based primarily on tide, courts sometimes inquire into the parties' in-
tentions.95 Courts also use constructive trust or implied contract theo-
ries to allow a party without title to recover, particularly where one
cohabitant has promised to title property jointly or coerced the other
into releasing an interest in what had been ajoindly tided asset. 6
94 E.g, Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923, 926-27 (Ariz. 1986) (partition ofjointly titled
real and personal property); Libby v. Lorrain, 430 A.2d 37, 38-39 (Me. 1981) (parti-
tion ofjointly titled real estate); Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 255 (Minn. 1977)
(partition of real and personal property); Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 510-11 (Or.
1978) (determining parties' respective rights as cotenants). Some cases turn on the
specific form in which title is held. E.g.,Jones v. Green, 337 N.W.2d 85, 85-87 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1983) (refusing to partition property because title was held as joint tenants
with right of survivorship). A number of cases involve property held by cohabitants as
if they were married. E.g., Estate of Wilson, 740 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(ruling that propertyjointly held by unmarried persons is held in tenancy in common
unless joint tenancy is proved by evidence other than the fact that pr6perty was erro-
neously titled as if the couple were married); Brazell v. Meyer, 600 P.2d 460, 462-63
(Or. Ct. App. 1979); see also Diedricks v. Reinhardt, 466 So. 2d 375, 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (ruling that the widow of a male cohabitant/cotenant was entitled to an
accounting from the female cohabitant/cotenant).
95 E.g., Carlson, 256 N.W.2d at 255; Kinkenon, 301 N.W.2d at 79-80; see also Wade
v. Porreca, 472 N.Y.S.2d 482, 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (concluding that the parties
must have intended to share earnings as well as expenses based on evidence of how
the parties handled bank accounts).
96 See Bramlett v. Selman, 597 S.W.2d 80, 84-85 (Ark. 1980) (imposing construc-
tive trust where one cohabitant placed funds for a down payment in the other cohabi-
tant's name); Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610, 615-17 (Ct. App. 1986)
(implied contract theory); Edwards v. Miller, 378 N.E.2d 583, 586-87 (Il. App. Ct.
1978) (imposing a constructive trust after the defendant pressured the plaintiff to
transfer her interest to him); Sullivan v. Rooney, 533 N.E.2d 1372, 1374 (Mass. 1989)
(imposing a constructive trust based on the promise to convey joint title); Estate of
Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. 1983) (imposing a constructive trust where the
parties intended joint ownership); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (Nev. 1984) (involv-
ing an implied agreement to hold property as if married); Small v. Harper, 638
S.W.2d 24, 26-27 (Tex. App. 1982) (allowing cohabitant's claim to proceed based on
constructive trust and oral partnership); ef. Collins v. Guggenheim, 631 N.E.2d 1016,
1017 (Mass. 1994) (holding no claim for constructive trust without a showing of
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, or other misconduct); Kohler v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d
647, 649 (N.D. 1992) (holding that cohabitation is not a sufficient basis for partition
without evidence of intent to own property jointly); Doe v. Roe, 475 S.E.2d 783,
786-87 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (same). A few of the constructive trust cases involve facts
that are closer to the implied contract theory recognized in Marvin. See, e.g., Estate of
Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d at 674; Williams v. Lynch, 666 N.Y.S.2d 749, 751-52 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997) (allowing the claim for constructive trust where the cohabitant's money
and effort were used to improve the partner's property). In both of these states, how-
ever, recovery on an implied contract theory would not have been available.
1398 [V€OL- 76:5
ORDINARY COHABITATION
C. Joint Financial Investment in Property or a Business Must Be
Compensated at the End of a Relationship
Even without proof of an express agreement, courts frequently
grant relief to a former cohabitant who loaned money to a partner or
invested funds directly in the partner's business or property. This type
of recovery is based either on an implied contract theory, or equitable
principles of restitution or constructive trust.97 The usual remedy in
these cases is compensation for the funds invested.
Cohabiting partners who have recovered in these cases have typi-
cally made a substantial equity investment in real estate or personal
property titled in the other partner's name.98 Simply making monthly
mortgage payments is not generally sufficient.99 Claimants are also
successful in cases allegingjoint business ventures, provided that both
cohabitants invested funds in the enterprise. 100 Recovery is based on
either restitution or an implied partnership agreement.
97 See Weekes v. Gay, 256 S.E.2d 901, 904 (Ga. 1979) (imposing a constructive
trust where the cohabitant furnished funds to purchase property); Kaiser v. Strong,
735 N.E.2d 144, 145-46 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (allowing recovery for "money had and
received" where the plaintiff gave the defendant more than $47,000 to pay off the
mortgage balance); Lawlis v. Thompson, 405 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Wis. 1987) (ordering
restitution of $65,000 transferred to the cohabitant to pay for real estate, farm equip-
ment, and divorce settlement); see also Saporta v. Saporta, 766 So. 2d 379, 380-81 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (applying constructive principles to award to the wife a home
purchased with her funds during cohabitation prior to marriage and which had been
titled in husband's name to prove that he would be the head of their household).
98 E.g., Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Colo. 2000) (investment of
$170,000 toward the cost of constructing a new residence); Kaiser 735 N.E.2d at 147
($47,000 to pay off the mortgage balance); Spafford v. Coats, 455 N.E.2d 241,245 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983) (the plaintiff furnished "substantially all" of the consideration for four
vehicles owned by the defendant); Estate of Palmen, 588 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Minn.
1999) (investment of $17,000 in materials and $30,000 in labor for construction of a
cabin); Collins v. Davis, 315 S.E.2d 759, 761 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (money loaned for
purchase and improvement of real estate); see also Ward v. Jahnke, 583 N.W.2d 656,
661 (WIS. C. App. 1998) (involving one cohabitant who paid the parties' living ex-
penses for three and a half years, allowing the other to save S1l,000 for the downm
payment on his house).
99 E.g., Ayala v. Fox, 564 N.E.2d 920, 922 (I1. 1990) (denying recovery based on
contributions to mortgage payments).
100 E.g., Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d 922, 927-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); W.
States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1224-25 (Nev. 1992); Lee v. Slovak, 440
N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38,43 (Tenn. 1991);
cf. Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 105-06 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a
cohabitant who invested services but no property in the business was entitled only to
restitution for the value of services). In a series of cases, the Oregon Court of Appeals
has granted equity interests in property to cohabitants who were active partners in a
business conducted on the property, based on "general equitable principles." &e
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D. A Cohabitant May Recover in Quantum Meruit for Services to the
Other Partner's Business or Property Interests
The case law of cohabitation makes it clear that courts will not
order compensation for services performed by one partner that can
be characterized as part of the ordinary give-and-take of a shared
life.' 0' Where these services go beyond the everyday, compensation is
made available under a quantum meruit theory. Some cases involve
services performed for a partner's business; 0 2 another group of cases
involves services invested in home construction or renovation. 103
E. A Cohabiting Partner Does Not Share in the Other Partner's Financial
Gains (or Losses) from Employment and Investment
Most state courts have agreed with the California Supreme
Court's conclusion in Marvin that marital or community property laws
do not apply to nonmarital partners. 0 4 Therefore, an unmarried co-
habitant does not have the type of claim to a share of the other part-
ner's earnings that a spouse could make in a divorce proceeding. As
some courts put this point, cohabitation alone does not give rise to a
presumption of shared property rights. 10 5
Raimer v. Wheeler, 849 P.2d 1122, 1123 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Wilkinson v. Higgins,
844 P.2d 266, 268-69 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Shuraleff v. Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764, 768
(Or. Ct. App. 1991).
101 Some cases permit recovery for housekeeping services on a quantum menit
basis, particularly if the plaintiff was hired on this basis before the cohabitation rela-
tionship began. See, e.g., Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 704-08 (Wis. 1980). Tradi-
tionally, restitution has not been available for housework performed by a household
member based on a presumption that such services are gratuitously provided. See
generally Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights ofDe Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the l'alue
of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1976).
102 See, e.g., Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103; Humiston v. Bushnell, 394 A.2d 844,
845 (N.H. 1978); Suggs v. Norris, 364 S.E.2d 159, 162-63 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988);
Harman v. Rogers, 510 A.2d 161, 165 (Vt. 1986).
103 See, e.g., Salzman, 996 P.2d at 1266; Mason v. Rostad, 476 A.2d 662, 666 (D.C.
1984).
104 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 120-21 (Cal. 1976); see also Watts v. Watts,
405 N.W.2d 303, 305-06, 307-09 (Wis. 1987). As noted above, however, these princi-
ples are now applied to cohabiting couples in several states "by analogy." See supra
text accompanying note 62.
105 See, e.g., Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142, 145 (Conn. 1987); Aehegma v.
Aehegma, 797 P.2d 74, 79 (Haw. CL App. 1990); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325,
1331-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Davis v. Davis, 643 So. 2d 931, 932 (Miss. 1994); Martin
v. Coleman, 19 S.W.3d 757, 760-61 (Tenn. 2000). Cohabitants have sought to recover
on the basis of implied agreements to share earnings, but recovery on this basis is
relatively rare beyond those states described supra in notes 62 to 64 and accompany-
ing text.
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One particularly dramatic recent case from California involved
claims by Claire Maglica against her long-time partner, Anthony Mag-
lica, seeking to recover a portion of the enormous increase in the
value of his company during their twenty-year cohabitation. 0G The ev-
idence established that Claire and Anthony "worked side by side build-
ing the business" and that its enormous success was "thanks in part to
some great ideas and hard work on Claire's part. . ... 107 In the ab-
sence of proof of a financial investment by Claire, or proof of an im-
plied contract to share the equity of the business equally, Claire's
recovery was limited to the value of the services she provided.' 03
Moreover, the appellate court reversed the jury's award of $84 million
to Claire, reasoning that the quantum meruit recovery should be mea-
sured by what it would have cost Anthony to obtain those services
from someone else rather than the amount by which he had benefited
from her services. 10 9 Pointing out that Claire had not established a
right to an equity stake, the court wrote, "People who work for busi-
nesses for a period of years and then walk away with $84 million do so
because they have acquired some equity in the business, not because
$84 million is the going rate for the services of even the most
workaholic manager."" 0
F. Cohabitants Are Not Entitled to Restitution for Other Services or
Financial Contributions
The cohabitation cases indicate that courts will not order restitu-
tion for unequal contributions of funds or effort to the parties' shared
life. Individuals are not generally compensated for such contributions
as paying the rent or a mortgage, paying more than half the parties'
shared living expenses, raising or supporting children or stepchildren,
or assisting with a partner's career."' In denying compensation, one
court put the issue this way: "The evidence clearly establishes parties
106 Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101.
107 Id. at 103.
108 Id. at 103-04. Claire argued that they had an implied contract to share the
equity of the business. This claim was rejected by thejury, but the court of appeals
held that the jury was not properly instructed and remanded this aspect of the case.
See id. at 108-10. The Maglicas settled their dispute for S29,000,000 midway through
the second trial. See Marosi, supra note 15, at B1.
109 See Afaglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102.
110 Id.
111 See eg., Maria v. Freitas, 832 P.2d 259, 274-75 (Hfaw. 1992); Bright v. Kuehil,
650 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Cames v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 759
(Mich. C. App. 1981); Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E.2d 1, 6-7 (Ohio C. App. 1994);
Seward v. Mentrup, 622 N.E.2d 756, 757 (Ohio C. App. 1993); Mitchell %. Moore, 729
A.2d 1200, 1206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). As noted above, these services may be the basis
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living in a family relationship with each contributing work or money
to the common cause and each receiving mutual benefits from the
joiit efforts."" 2 This is a corollary to the rules described above and
serves to limit recovery to the more extraordinary cases in which one
partner has made a very substantial investment of time or money in
the other partner's business or assets. As another court commented,
'We do not perceive this doctrine to invest this court with a roving
mandate to sort through terminated personal relationships in an at-
tempt to nicely judge and balance the respective contributions of the
parties."1 3 In this respect, these cases are similar to divorce cases in
which the courts are extremely reluctant to measure and compare the
respective contributions of husband and wife.114
The boundary between those contributions subject to restitution
and those which are not was carefully maintained in Ward v. Jahnke115
Sandra Ward and DennisJahnke lived together for twelve years, main-
taining separate finances throughout that period. During the first
three and a half years, however, they lived in Sandra's apartment. She
paid the rent and all household expenses, so that Dennis could save
money for the down payment on a house. After Dennis bought a
house, they lived there together, with Dennis paying the mortgage
and Sandra paying for utilities and groceries. The court concluded
that Sandra was entitled to restitution based on their mutual effort
toward accumulating the $11,000 Dennis saved for a down payment,
but that she was not entitled to share in the increase in the value of
the house during the'years they lived in it together, when they had no
shared economic enterprise.11 6
III. LIMITS OF THE CuRRENT LAw
Taken altogether, the legal norms of ordinary cohabitation devel-
oped in the quarter century since Marvin are not particularly gener-
for finding an implied contract of some sort in a few states. See supra notes 64-66 and
accompanying text.
112 Murphy v. Bowen, 756 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); see also Tapley v,
Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218, 1219-20 (N.H. 1982); Koklowski v. Kozlowski, 395 A.2d 913,
919 (NJ. 1978); Morone v. Morone, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (N.Y. 1980).
113 Slocum v. Hammond, 346 N.W.2d 485, 491-92 (Iowa 1984).
114 See, e.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) ("[T]ihe
courts cannot and will not strike a balance regarding the contributions of each to the
marriage and then translate that into a monetary award."); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453
A.2d 527, 533 (NJ. 1982) ("Marriage is not a business arrangement in which the
parties keep track of debits and credits, their accounts to be settled upon divorce.").
115 583 N.W.2d 656 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
116 See id at 661-62.
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ous. Only a small percentage of cohabitants w~ill have even a
possibility of legal recovery when their relationships end. To the ex-
tent that these rules have any effect on the choice between cohabita-
tion and marriage, they are likely to encourage marriage for anyone
seeking financial security and to encourage cohabitation rather than
marriage for anyone seeking to avoid financial commitments.
Moreover, as a number of legal scholars pointed out in the years
after Marvin was decided, the various doctrines the court discussed
provide some basis for property allocation at the end of cohabitation
relationships, but they do very little else."17 Twenty-five years after
Marvin, cohabitation remains entirely distinct from marriage, even in
those states that have gone the farthest toward assimilating the two
statuses. Cohabitants in California have no access to social security 18
and less access to other types of public and private insurance coverage
that provide financial security for those in married families." 0 They
have no standing to sue for wrongful death, loss of consortium, or
emotional distress if their partner is killed or injured, 20 no access to
testimonial privileges,' 21 and no right to treatment as a family for vari-
ous state and federal tax purposes. 1'22
The Principles of the Law ofFamily Dissolution,'2 recently adopted by
the American Law Institute, propose that cohabitants be entitled to
property and support remedies on the same basis as married individu-
als. This proposal effectively adopts and extends the approach taken
to stable, long-term cohabitation in states such as Washington, Ne-
117 See generally Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Per-
spective, 28 UCLA L. RE-. 1125 (1981); William A. ReppyJr., Property ad Support Rights
of Unmanied Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Stats 44 L%. L Rrv. 1677
(1984).
118 See Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 296 (1979). See generally Blumberg, supra
note 117, at 1144-49. As Blumberg points out, many of these programs do take un-
married cohabitation into account for the purpose of reducing or eliminating bene-
fits, id. at 1138, and cohabitation is also used to reduce or deny benefits under
programs like AFDC, see i. at 1153-57.
119 See Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 663 P.2d 904, 905 (Cal. 1983)
(unemployment insurance); Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593, 596-97
(Ct. App. 1992) (liability insurance); Dep't of Indus. Relations %. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd., 156 Cal. Rptr. 183, 185 (Ct. App. 1979) (workers' compensation.); see
also Blumberg, supra note 117, at 1140-44.
120 See Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 594 (Cal. 1988) (no claim for emotional
distress or loss of consortium); Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, 188 Cal. Rptr. 31, 33 (Ct.
App. 1982) (no claim for wrongful death).
121 See People v. Delph, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (CL App. 1979).
122 See Blumberg, supra note 117, at 1157-59.
123 PRINCIPLES OF THE Lw OF FAMILY DISSOLwTION § 6 (Tentative Draft No. 4,
2000) [hereinafter ALI PnRtwcn'us].
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vada, and Oregon. 124 If widely adopted, the ALI Principles would allow
financial recovery to many more cohabiting partners at the end of
their relationships. They also have the strong virtue of extending
equally to same-sex and opposite-sex cohabiting couples.12" The ALI
Principles are limited, however, to the private law aspect of family life
and do not advocate the kinds of public law measures that would
equate the treatment of cohabiting families and married families.
Another limitation of the Marvin approach is that it ignores the
presence of children in a cohabiting household. Although Lee and
Michelle Marvin did not have children, many of the parties in the
cases that followed did raise children together. 126 By 1995, fifty per-
cent of cohabiting households had children present. 127 Since 1976,
the framework of legal rules governing paternity determination, child
support, and custody for nonmarital children has grown enormously,
and under those rules the parental rights and obligations of unmar-
ried biological parents are now largely equivalent to those of married
parents. But in divorce cases, property and support remedies may be
influenced by a concern for children's support or for compensation of
a caregiver, 128 and the link between these is lost for nonmarital chil-
dren. In this respect, the ALI Principles are a clear improvement 2 9
124 The ALI Principles define "domestic partners" as two persons of the same or
opposite sex, not married to each other, "who for a significant period of time share a
primary residence and a life together as a couple." Id § 6.01 (1). This determination
is made under principles that are elaborated in § 6.03. Id. § 6.03. Where parties qual-
ify as domestic partners, most of the rules governing property and support rights of
married couples are made applicable under §§ 6.04-.06. Domestic partners would be
governed by these rules unless they reached an agreement othenvise. See id. § 6.01.
125 See id. § 6.01(1).
126 See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1205 (Ill. 1979); Goode v. Goode,
396 S.E.2d 430, 432 (W. Va. 1990); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Wis. 1987).
127 See sources cited supra note 51.
128 See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AC § 307 [Alternative B], 9A U.LA.
288-89 (Part 1) (1998) (directing the court deciding property division to consider
"the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for a reasona-
ble period to the spouse having custody of any children"); id. § 308(a) (2), 9A U.LA.
446 (authorizing the court to grant a maintenance order to a spouse who is "the
custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the
custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home"). For an argument
that these policies should be given greater weight in divorce proceedings, see gener-
ally Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of IFamily Care, 71
N.G. L. REv. 721 (1993).
129 See ALI PRINCIPS, supra note 123, §§ 6.05-.06 (providing for allocation of
property and "compensatory payments" for domestic partners on the same basis as
married individuals).
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A more difficult problem confronts cohabitants who are steppar-
ents for their partners' children. Without a marriage, stepparent
adoption is not generally available to formalize this relationship, leav-
ing a cohabiting stepparent with no legal tie to the child.'" Con-
versely, a child has no basis for claiming support from a non-marital
stepparent'13' This problem is on the current frontier of cohabitation
law, and courts in some states have begun cautiously to address it.1S2
Here as well, the ALI Principles would move the law toward compara-
ble treatment for cohabiting and married couples.133
130 This issue has been litigated primarily by same-sex couples, and courts in some
jurisdictions have permitted "second parent adoptions" in these cases. Se, e.g., In re
Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397,405-06 (N.Y. 1995); Adoption of B.LV.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276
(Vt 1993). See generally Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Adoption of Child by Same.Sx Part-
nes, 27 A-L.5th 54 (1995). In New York, the rule extends to opposite-sex cohab-
iting couples as well. See In reJacob, 660 N.E.2d at 405.
131 See Laurence C. Nolan, Legal Strangers and the Duty of Support: Beyond the Biologi-
cal Tie-But How Far Beyond the Marital Tie?, 41 S.ANTA CLARA L REv. 1, 35-37 (2000).
132 When cohabiting couples have biological children together, both parents have
parental rights and obligations with respect to those children. Several recent cases
have concluded that a cohabiting partner without a biological tie to his partner's
child cannot establish parental rights, even if he believed himself to be and acted as a
parent for the child. See Petition of Ash, 507 N.AV.2d 400, 404-05 (Iowia 1993); Van V.
Zahorik, 597 N.,.2d 15, 23 (Mich. 1999); Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C.
1997). But seelV. v. IV., 728 A.2d 1076, 1087 (Conn. 1999) (holding mother's cohabi-
tant equitably estopped from denying paternity). By contrast, a married man who is
not the biological father of his wife's child is often treated as the child's "equitable
parent" and may be estopped from denying paternity. See, e.g., In re Gallagher, 539
N.W.2d 479, 483 (Iowa 1995). See generally Alan Stephens, Annotation, Parental Rights
of Man Wzo Is Not Biological or Adoptive Father of Child But Was Husband or Cohabitant of
Mother Wen Child Was Conceived or Born, 84 A.L.R.4th 655 (1991). Some state statutes
permit a cohabitant without a legal or biological tie to a child to seek visitation. Eg.,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.09.160, 26.09.240 (West 1997), discussed in In reWolcott,
933 P.2d 1066, 1068-69 (Wash. Ct App. 1997) (denying visitation), aff'd in part and
rev'd in par, 969 P.2d 21, 27 (Wash. 1998). There is a constitutional question as to
how broadly these statutes may be applied following the Supreme Court's ruling in
Troxel v. Grainvill, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
133 Section 2.03(1) defines "parent" to include a legal parent, a parent by estop-
pel, and a de facto parent. ALI PINciPtErs, supra note 123, § 2.03(1). A "parent by
estoppel" is defined as an individual who has lived with a child for at least two years
and acted as a parent in circumstances that serve to estop the legal parent from con-
testing the individual's status as a parent. Id. § 2.03(1)(b). "De facto parent" is de-
fined as an adult who has resided with the child for a significant period of time and
who has regularly performed either a majority of the caretaking functions for the
child or a share of the caretaking at least as great as that of the parent with whom the
child has lived primarily. Id. § 2.21 (setting out the circumstances in which parental
responsibilities could be allocated to parents by estoppel and de facto parents). Al-
though the definition of a de facto parent is designed to be a narrow one that few
individuals who are not legal parents will be able to satisfy, this rule and the rule
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As a policy matter, the current legal regime functions reasonably
well for two of the three groups described above. For couples who
cohabit briefly before marriage, the primary legal question is how to
treat any economic changes that occurred during that period.134 For
those couples who have deliberately rejected marriage, the legal de-
vices surveyed in the Marvin decision are available to adjust the equi-
ties where the individuals have not used written agreements, wills, or
other devices to protect their interests. Indeed, there are important
arguments for not imposing marriage-like rules in this situation.' ,
For couples whose cohabitation begins as a response to circum-
stances, such as an unintended pregnancy, and continues indefi-
nitely,136 the legal and policy problems are much more complex, and
the current rules are much less adequate. Frequently, these are
households with children. 137 The demographic evidence suggests
that they are more likely to be poor, working class, and African-Ameri-
can families. 138 These may be relationships of long duration, with
substantial sharing and dependence over time. The parties may have
good reasons for deciding not to marry. When the relationship ends,
the parties are likely to confront the same needs and difficulties that
married people face at the end of a marriage, but the law will have
very little to contribute toward working things out.
CONCLUSION
To the extent that the trend away from marriage is encouraged
or accelerated by changes in the law, it is hard to identify the impact
of high profile cases like Marvin and the celebrity palimony suits that
followed it. How far are wider cultural norms set by the rich and fa-
governing parents by estoppel make no distinction between adults married to a
child's legal parent and other adults. See id. at xxxvi-xxxviii.
134 In California, a married person who wants to make financial claims based on a
period of premarital cohabitation is required to bring "a Marvin action" in addition to
the divorce proceeding. See Watkins v. Watkins, 192 Cal. Rptr, 54, 55-56 (Ct. App.
1983); see also Rolle v. Rolle, 530 A.2d 847, 851-52 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)
(allowing for equitable remedies to divide assets acquired by one spouse during the
period of premarital cohabitation); In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 332
(Wash. 1984) (requiring that courts make equitable disposition of property acquired
during the premarital relationship).
135 See, e.g., David L. Chambers, The "Legalization" of the Family: Toward a Policy of
Supportive Neutrality, 18 U. MXCH.J.L. REFORM 805, 826 (1985). But see Blumberg, supra
note 117, at 1167-70.
136 These are the "risk relationships" described supra at text accompanying note
38.
137 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
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mous? What impact do the many marriages of Elizabeth Taylor or the
famous divorces of Johnny Carson and Donald Trump have on the
behavior of ordinary folks?
Within the law, other developments have had far greater practical
consequences for cohabiting families than the Marvin decision. Many
states abolished criminal penalties for cohabitation, adultery, and for-
nication during the decades before and after the Marvin decision. 3 9
With its decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird,140 the Supreme Court ruled
that states must give unmarried individuals the same rights to use con-
traceptives enjoyed by married couples.1 41 In one series of decisions
beginning with Stanley v. Illinois in 1972, the Court recognized and
elaborated parental rights for unved fathers,142 and in another, begin-
ning with Levy v. Louisana in 1968, the Court eliminated the tradi-
tional legal disabilities of illegitimate children. 143
The Marvin decision drew popular attention to the legal ques-
tions that emerge from cohabitation relationships. By suggesting that
courts utilize readily available tools-property, contract, and restitu-
tion law-the opinion helped define the range of remedies that
courts across the country would apply to the growing numbers of co-
habitation property claims. But Marvin and the cases that followed
were careful to maintain a substantial rhetorical and practical distance
from the law of cohabitation.144 This distance marks these decisions
as fundamentally conservative.
139 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on Adultery and Fornication (1962). At
the time the court made its ruling in Marvin, California had recently abolished its
criminal statute prohibiting adulterous cohabitation. Se Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d
106, 112 n.4 (Cal. 1976); see also In re Estate of Steffes, 290 NAV.2d 697, 708-09 (Wis.
1980). See generally Martha L. Fineman, Law and Cianging Patterns of Behatior Sanc-
tions on Non-marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L RE,. 275, 276-77 (1981). A number of
states still have these laws on the books, but they are rarely enforced. &e Common-
wealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Mass. 1983) (holding that the adultery statute
was constitutional and could be applied to private consensual acts between adults).
See generally Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restriclions on Pft. and Ex-
tramarital Sex, 104 HARv. L. RE.. 1660 (1991).
140 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
141 See id. at 454-55.
142 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 267 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978). Although it was not the basis for the Court's holding, it is
worth noting that in these cases only those fathers who lived together with their part-
ner and the nonmarital child were extended constitutionally recognized parental
rights. Compare Stanley and Caban (protecting parental rights) ith Quilloin and Ler
(refusing protection).
143 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 (1968).
144 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976).
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Writing for the court, Justice Tobriner acknowledged in Marvin
the "pervasiveness" of nonmarital relationships and the importance of
effectuating justice between the parties to these relationships. At the
same time, he emphasized the court's view that cohabitation could
not be accorded the same respect as marriage. 145 More recent cases
from the California courts have reiterated this point, leaving for the
legislature the larger problem of whether and how far to extend legal
protections to individuals in cohabitation relationships. 146 In Califor-
nia, and in other states, legislatures have declined to take up this
question.
Those who believe that law is a useful tool for shaping family be-
havior sometimes argue for maintaining a strong distinction between
cohabitation and marriage in order to channel couples into marriage.
The experience of the past quarter century, however, is not encourag-
ing on this front. With more than four million cohabiting couples in
the United States today,147 the law's failure to address cohabitation is
increasingly difficult to justify. One result of the fear that cohabita-
tion will encroach further on marriage is that the courts have largely
taken themselves out of the process of creating broader social norms
to govern nonmarital relationships.
Cohabitation has become well established as a demographic real-
ity and an emerging social practice. In the law, however, cohabitation
is still regarded as anomolous, and its consequences remain highly
indeterminate. Twenty-five years after Marvin v. Marvin, cohabitants
are still left to their own devising, in a space set off between legal
rules, In this respect, for all their fame and fortune, Lee and Michelle
were simply ordinary.
145 Id-
Lest we be misunderstood, however, we take this occasion to point out
that the structure of society itself largely depends upon the institution of
marriage, and nothing we have said in this opinion should be taken to dero-
gate from that institution. Thejoining of the man and woman in marriage is
at once the most socially productive and individually fulfilling relationship
that one can enjoy in the course of a lifetime.
Id. at 122.
146 See, e.g., Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 663 P.2d 904, 907-08
(Cal. 1983); People v. Delph, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422, 424-25 (Ct. App. 1979) (denying tie
marital communication privilege to unmarried cohabitants).
147 See supra text accompanying note 20.
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